Evolution of stepping stone detection and emerging applications by Omar, Mohd Nizam et al.
 
 
Evolution of Stepping Stone Detection and Emerging Applications  
 
MOHD NIZAM OMAR1, ANGELA AMPHAWAN2, ROSHIDI DIN3 
InterNetWorks Research Laboratory1,2, School of Computing3, UUM College of Arts and Sciences 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
UUM Sintok, 06010, Kedah 
MALAYSIA 
niezam@uum.edu.my1, angela@uum.edu.my2, roshidi@uum.edu.my3 
http://www.internetworks.my1,2 http://www.soc.uum.edu.my3 
 
Abstract: - Stepping Stone Detection (SSD) is conventionally intended for the detection of series of host 
computers used by attackers to hide their track in a network or host environment.  This paper discusses the 
evolution of SSD and potential applications in other emerging fields.  Novel, unique SSD models will be 
presented for spam, backdoor and proxy detections and expressed mathematically. These preliminary models 
have promising solutions for addressing current problems in these areas and may be expanded on in the future. 
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1 Introduction 
Stepping Stone Detection (SSD)-based research 
was instigated by [1] in 1995. To date, there are 
more than 50 varieties of SSD [2] focusing on 
the detection of list of host computers used by 
the attacker to hide their track. For example, [3] 
proposed a time-based method in interactive 
sessions, [4] relates to the delay and chaff 
problem and the latest research by [5] applied 
Artificial Intelligent (AI) techniques in 
detecting the stepping stone.  
Although SSD is conventionally used for 
retrieving the list of host computers in detecting 
the attacker, recent explorations indicate that it 
is possible to extend the theory of SSD to other 
emerging fields. In this paper, we present the 
evolution of conventional SSD and suggest 
three important emerging research fields where 
SSD would be valuable, namely SPAM, 
backdoor and proxy detection.  A novel, unique 
SSD model will be presented for each emerging 
field and expressed mathematically. These 
preliminary models have promising solutions 
for addressing current problems in these areas 
and may be expanded on in the future.   
The paper proceeds as follows. To 
understand the SSD models presented later, 
important terminologies for SSD are first 
defined in Section II.  In Section III, as a basis 
for the modeling, the general concept of SSD 
and the current, previous and future landscape 
for SSD are illustrated.  Section IV then 
presents our three novel SSD models for 




Important terminologies are presented here to 
facilitate the understanding of the models presented 
in later sections. A host is any computer that 
connected to a computer network.  In stepping stone 
detection-based research, the source refers to the 
origin host.  The destination refers to the destination 
of the source. A target or victim is usually defined 
as the last destination of the stepping stone. Another 
term that needs to be considered is the incoming and 
outgoing flow. Incoming flow refers to the data that 
enters a host and outgoing flow indicates the data 
leave a host. Stepping stone occurs when the host is 
used for forwarding the data, i.e.by entering and 
then exiting the host.  Stepping stone detection can 
be defined as the processes of detecting the stepping 
stoned host. When one host forwards data to another 
host, this is known as the connection chain. The 
main goal of stepping stone detection research is to 
collects the list of hosts. Host-based SSD (HSSD) is 
SSD focused on solving the stepping stone problem 
in a host as compared to Network-based SSD 
(NSSD) which targets SSD problems in a network 
environment. 
 
3 Past, Current and Future SSD 
As an overview to SSD and to place our novel SSD 
models for emerging fields in context, the general 
concept of SSD and the research landscape of SSD 
are presented here. 





3.1 General Concept of SSD 




Figure 1: Basic of Stepping Stone Detection 
 
From Fig. 1, there are three hosts labeled as A, B 
and C. Host B (Host i) exists before Host A (Host i - 
1) and Host C (Host i + 1) exists after Host B. i 
represents the current stepping stoned host, i - 1 
represents the host before the i host and i + 1 
represents the host after the i-th host. Each host has 
its own incoming and outgoing flow. Host A has 
one incoming (Ain) and one outcoming flow (Aout). 
Host B and C also have their corresponding 
incoming and outgoing flow, denoted Bin, Cin and 
Bout, Cout respectively.  
 Any host may be defined as a stepping stoned 
host when the incoming flow is similar to outgoing 
flow.If nin and nout represent incoming and outgoing 
flow on host n, 
 
            ProxySSD =                 (1) 
 
From (1), if the incoming and outgoing flow is 
equal, this means the host is a stepping 
stoned host or nss. Otherwise, the host is not a 
stepping stone. 
 The connection chain from Host A to Host B, 
denoted by CCAB (may also can be denoted as CCBA 
because CCAB = CCBA) occurs when Host A and B 
are nss. A or B represents the source or destination 
of the stepping stone. In Fig. 1, there are two 
connection chains, CCAB and CCBC. 
 In SSD, the series of connection chain that exists 
along the network that we monitor may be 




wheres is the source, d is the destination. From (2), 
it is clear that SSD has a collection of CC 
from to    . 
 
However, it is only to be true when the number of 
CC is more than one, |SSD|> 1. 
 
3.2 Past SSD 
As the pioneer in SSD research, [1] proposed the 
concept of ‘thumbprint’ that summarized a packet’s 
content by providing it with a unique identity which 
differentiated it from other packets. However, the 
thumbprint solution was not suitable for encrypted 
connections. Consequently, [6] and [3] proposed 
on/off and deviation methods respectively. 
Unfortunately, these two methods were prone to 
high false positive and active perturbation problems. 
[7] proposed the “reply-echo” method to reduce the 
false positive problem and [8] proposed overcoming 
the perturbation problem using APA. APA is a 
technique created by the intruder to influence the 
SSD process. At the same time, [9] applied the 
Inter-packet delay (IPD) method to solve the 
stepping stone problem by proposing a new use of 
data that is more effective in detecting stepping 
stones.  
 After [7] first introduced a new technique, 
Round Trip Time (RTT), which is for reducing the 
false positive rate, past SSD researches began 
conducting experiments related to [7]’s research. 
Research by [10] introduced the “Step-Function” 
and “Conservative & Heuristic” [11] which were 
methods enhanced from [7] methods. Meanwhile, 
research by [12] was the only research that focused 
on the wireless environment in detecting stepping 
stones. In conclusion, it seems that past SSD 
research focused on the right data type to be used in 
the SSD approach. The differences lie only in 
different types of data (e.g. data, time, inter-packet 
delay) and their concentration on RTT at the end of 
the past SSD period. 
 
3.3 Current SSD 
[13], [17], [15], [16] and [18] have shown that 
SSD researchers have changed their focus from 
enhancing the SSD approach to something that can 
make SSD more robust against perturbation. This 
can be seen in research by [13] that re-directed SSD 
research towards achieving less false positives and 
false negative rates. [19] created a method to 
influence SSD and [15] provided a testbed through 
which the SSD approach can be examined. [14], on 
the other hand, provided SSD taxonomy to expose 
those outside the field to SSD.  
 Research on the present SSD have become 
more widespread with the introduction of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) techniques. Research which 




applies AI techniques are referred to as RTT-based 
research [20], [18], [21], [22]. This effort was 
started by [21] who proposed the data mining 
technique to mine for TCP/IP packets in the effort 
of finding RTT. The application of AI was 
continued by [18] who introduced the Neural 
Network technique that focuses on finding RTT. 
From the discussion on AI techniques that have 
been used, it seems that their technique had the 
potential of solving SSD problems. 
 The present SSD research not only focuses on 
issues beyond those of the past SSD research, but 
also introduces new discoveries to the SSD research 
world. The introduction of different AI techniques 
used to detect RTT and later to detect stepping 
stones, shows that the present SSD is evolving. The 
present SSD also shows that the extensive buffering 
method used as perturb to the present SSD approach 
exists [19]. There are also studies which focus on 
confidence bound [13], false positive and false 
negative rates [18]. Attached testbed which is much 
needed in SSD research has also been proposed by 
[15]. 
 
3.4 Future SSD 
 Future SSD would focus on the development of 
SSD testbeds. The standard testbed is necessary to 
the SSD-based research to execute the standard 
experiment or testing. In the testbed, the 
requirements, the tools and the topology that will be 
used are well defined. So far, SSD research has only 
depended on the testbed developed by [15]. 
Unfortunately, this testbed has still to be made 
known to the public. Moreover, from the readings it 
was found that a standard SSD testbed does not 
exist to date and most researchers use their own 
testbeds. Because of the use of AI techniques in the 
SSD environment, future SSD should focus on the 
development of testbeds that support AI SSD.
 Another possibility that could become the 
research focus for future SSD is the concept of 
hybrid SSD. More often than not, the past and 
present SSD research has only depended on 
network-based SSD (NSSD) [2], [1], [6]. Although 
these studies did not explicitly define their SSD 
approach as NSSD, the use of network packets as 
the main source of stepping stone detection process 
shows that it is NSSD. Studies by [14] and [26] 
have divided the SSD approach into network-based 
and host-based SSD (HSSD).  
 From the discussion on past, current and future 
SSD, it is concluded that all of the researcher focus 
to the main usage of SSD; to detect stepping stone 
either in host or network-based environment. No 
such a research that realized the other usage of the 
SSD in other fields of research. This is what we will 
provide in this paper, to provide a new direction of 
the stepping stone detection based research. 
 
4 Emerging Fields for Application of 
SSD 
As discussed in previous sections, stepping stone 
detection-based research was mostly limited to the 
detection of stepping stones without looking to the 
full capabilities of stepping stone detection in other 
fields of research.  Suggestions for potential 
applications of SSD in other fields are listed here. 
 
4.1 Spam Detection 
Spam is the abuse of electronic messaging systems 
by indiscriminate sending of unsolicited messages in 
bulk [27]. Although several types of media such as 
instant messaging, USENET newsgroup and web 
search engine fall prey to spam [28], the potential 
use for SSD may find its way in e-mail-based spam. 
A variety of spam detection techniques have 
been investigated for e-mail-based spam such as 
[29], [30] and [31]. In the case of [29], the detection 
is carried out manually and [30] filtering is proposed 
for spam detection.  However, both techniques 
classify a message by simply identifying keyword, 
phrase and sending address.  This results in a high 
percentage of false positive signals. To overcome 
the problem [31] recommended suggests the 
Artificial Intelligent (AI) techniques.  However, 
frequently, the application of AI in spam detection, 
such as data mining, tends to be time consuming. 
From the SSD perspective, a spam can be 
detected from the incoming and outgoing e-mail 
port from a host. Instead of detection on many 
choices of port that need to be monitored, detection 
of the spam can be made from the incoming port 
and the outgoing port of the e-mail. This allows the 
SSD approach to be more focused on the detection 
of a specific port, rather than all ports used by other 
applications. For instance, port number 25, 143 and 
110 are used for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP), Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) 
and Post Office Protocol Version 3 (POP3) 
applications of the e-mail, respectively. These are 
actually the ports that need to be monitored in SSD 
approach. In fact, the total number of ports used by 
the application range up to 65535 ports. 
The different point between the usages of SSD 
concept in the spam detection is the number of 
incoming and outgoing traffic definitely not in an 
equal numbers. In fact, the incoming spam usually 
addressed to one receiver, and then the same e-mail 




will be used to be sent to many other receivers. 




From (3), it is shows that the incoming e-mail in a 
host should be less than the outgoing of the e-mail. 
If there are n hosts involved in the spam stepping 




where k is the number of host.  
 
From (4), we can collect all of the host that involved 
as the spammed host as 
 
 
In (5), the spam SSD actually collects the 
connection chain between one host to another host. 
If (5) has been applied to different mail servers, the 
origin of the spam may possibly be identified easily. 
In other word, the list of hosts that are involved in 
the spam is actually the connection chain that exists 
between one host to another host. 
 
4.2 Proxy Server Detection 
A proxy server is a server that sits between a client 
application, such as a web browser and a real server 
[32].  A diverse range of approaches for proxy 
server detection have been investigated. The 
conventional approach is for the network 
administrator to use specialized monitoring software 
such as Wireshark [34] for proxy server detection.  
However, this approach is not infallible. Another 
approach is to use Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
which is more fail-safe than the conventional 
approach, although it can be time-consuming.  The 
use of data mining technique in IDS possibly is the 
cause of this latency [34][35][36]. 
To alleviate latency in proxy server detection, we 
propose a simple SSD-based approach.   A 
preliminary model of basic proxy server 
communication based on SSD is shown in Fig. 2.    
 
 
Form Fig. 2, Host j sends a request to Host l through 
Host k as the proxy server. Therefore, by using the 
definitions given in (1) and (2), CCj,k = CCk,l and 
CCl,k = CCk,j. 
For the proxy server detection through SSD, each 
host involved: 
 
For network-based proxy server detection or the list 





where k is the last number of host. By assuming  
 
Hosts,d also including Hostd,s for each host, we can 
write a full network-based in the form of 
 
From (7), it is clear that to detect the proxy server; 
we simply need to find the incoming and outgoing 
traffic on the chosen host. 
 
4.3 Backdoor Detection 
Backdoor can be defined as a hidden approach for 
bypassing normal computer authentication systems 
[37]. Most of the time, antivirus utilities play an 
important role in overcoming the backdoor problem 
[38]. However, this requires the right signature 
embedded into the antivirus and the detection can 
only be executed in host-based environment. For 
this reason, we propose a simpler solution for 
detecting backdoor by using concepts from stepping 
stone detection based-research. 
Backdoor detection using the SSD concept is 
directed to the host-based level. However, it is can 
be extended to the network-based level or detection 
on the chain of the backdoor so as to find the origin 
of the backdoor as discussed in (2). 
Referring to (1), a host can be defined as a 
stepping stone host when the incoming and outgoing 




flow through the host is the same.  In the backdoor 
situation, the detection occurs when a connection 
occurs for a many times for a specific port. It 
usually happens when the affected host suddenly 
sends a data to the outside network using the same 
port number and at the same period of time.  If the 
backdoor affects a number of hosts (used as 
stepping stone), we can use (2) to overcome the 
problem. Open research questions include the 
number of occurrences that need to be counted and 
the port affected by backdoors. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Conventionally for the detection of series of host 
computers by attackers, SSD also has untapped 
potential in several emerging research fields, 
namely in SPAM, backdoor and proxy detection.  
We present three novel SSD mathematical models 
to demonstrate the potential of SSD in addressing 
current issues in SPAM, backdoor and proxy 
detection.  For future work, extensive simulations 




[1] S. Staniford-Chen and L.T. Herberlein, 
“Holding Intruders Accountable on the 
Internet”, Proc. 1995 IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy, 1995, pp. 39-49. 
[2] S. Robert, C. Jie, J. Ping and C. Weifeng, “A 
Survey of Research in Stepping Stone 
Detection”, International Journal of Electronic 
Commerce Studies”, Vol . 2, No. 2, pp. 103 – 
126, 2001. 
[3] Y. Zhang and V. Paxson, “Detecting Stepping 
Stones”, Proc. 9th USENIX Security 
Symposium, 2000, pp. 67-81. 
[4] L. Zhang, A. G. Persaud, A. Johson, Y. Guan, 
“Stepping Stone Attack Attribution in Non-
Cooperative IP Networks”, in Proc. Of the 25th 
IEEE International Performance Computing 
and Conference (IPCCC 2006), 2006. 
[5] J. Yang, and S.S. Huang, “Matching TCP/IP to 
Detect Stepping-Stone Intrusion”, International 
Journal of Computer Science and Network 
Security (IJCSNS), vol. 6, no. 10, Oct. 2006, 
pp. 269-276. 
[6] K. Yoda and H. Etoh, “Finding Connection 
Chain for Tracing Intruders”, Proc. 6th 
European Symposium on Research in 
Computer Security (LNCS 1985),  2000, pp. 
31-42. 
[7] J. Yang, and S.S. Huang, “Matching TCP/IP to 
Detect Stepping-Stone Intrusion”, International 
Journal of Computer Science and Network 
Security (IJCSNS), vol. 6, no. 10, Oct. 2006, 
pp. 269-276. 
[8] D.L. Donoho, A.G. Flesia, U. Shankar, V. 
Paxson, J. Coit, and S. Staniford, “Multiscale 
stepping-stone detection: Detecting pairs of 
jittered interactive streams by exploiting 
maximum tolerable delay”, Proc. 5th 
International Symposium on Recent Advances 
in Intrusion Detection (RAID 2002), 2002, pp. 
49-64 
[9] X. Wang, D.S. Reeves, and S.F. Wu, “Inter-
packet delay based correlation for tracing 
encrypted connection through stepping stone”, 
Proc. 7th European Symposium on Research in 
Computer Security (ESORICS 2002), 2002, pp. 
244-263. 
[10] Y. Jianhua, and S.S. Huang, “A Real-Time 
Algorithm to Detect Long Connection Chains 
of Interactive Terminal Session”, Proc. 3rd 
International Conference on Information 
Security (Infosecu ‘04), 2004, pp. 198 – 203. 
[11] S. Jianhua, J. Hai, C. Hao and H. Zong-Fen, 
MA-IDS: A Distributed Intrusion Detection 
System Based on Data Mining, Wuhan 
University Jornal of Natural Science (WUJNS), 
10(1), pp. 111-114. 
[12] W. T. Strayer, C. E. Jones, I. Castineyra, J. B 
Levin and R. R Hain, “An Integrated 
architecture for attack attribution”, BBN 
Technologies, Technical Report. BBN 
REPORT-8384, 2003. 
[13] A. Blum, D. Song, and S. Benkataraman, 
“Detection of Interactive Stepping Stone: 
Algorithm and Confidence Bounds”, Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, Springer Berlin / 
Heidelberg, Volume 3224/2004, pg. 258-277, 
October 1, 2004. 
[14] A. Almulhem and I. Traore, “A Survey of 
Connection-chains Detection Technique”, 
2007IEEE Pacific Rim Conference on 
Communications, Computers ans Signal 
Processing, Victoria, B. C, Canada, 22 – 24 
August 2007, pp. 219 – 222. 
[15] X. Jianqiang, Z Lingeng, B. Aswegan, D. 
Daniels, J. T. Y. Guan,. (2006) A Testbed for 
Evaluation and Analysis of Stepping Stone 
Attack Attribution Techniques. Proc. 2nd 
International Conference on Testbeds and 
Research Infrastructures for the Development 
of Networks and Communities 
(TRIDENTCOM 2006), 1-3 March 2006, 
Barcelona, Spain, pp. 369-379. 
[16] M. Venkateshaiah, “Evading Existing Stepping 
Stone Detection Methods”, Master Thesis, 




University of Texas at Arlington, December 
2006. 
[17] A. Almulhem, Detection and Analysis of 
Connection Chains in Network Forensics, 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Electrical 
and Computer Engineering, University of 
Victoria, Canada. 
[18] H. Wu, and  S., S. Huang, Stepping Stone 
Intrusion Detection Using Neural Network 
Approach, Novel Algorithm and Techniques in 
Telecommunications, Automation and 
Industrial Electronics, pp. 358-363. 
[19] M. Venkateshaiah, and M. Wright, Evading 
Stepping Stone Detection Under the Cloak of 
Streaming Media, Technical Report, 
Department of Computer Science and 
Engineering, University of Texas at Arlington, 
Arlington, TX 76019, 2007. 
[20] J. Yang, and S. S.  Huang and D. W. Ming. A 
Clustering-Partitioning Algorithm to Find TCP 
Packet Round-Trip Time for Intrusion 
Detection, Proceeding of 20th International 
Conference on Advanced Information 
Networking and Applications (AINA 2009), 
Bradford, UK, pp. 231-236. 
[21] J. Yang, and S. S. Huang, S. S. Mining TCP/IP 
packet to detect stepping-stone intrusion. 
Computer & Security, 26(7-8), pp.479-484. 
[22] H. Wu, and S. S. Huang. Neural Network-
based Detection of Stepping Stone Intrusion. 
Expert Systems with Applications, 32(2), 
pp.1431-1437. 
[23] A. Almulhem and I. Traore. Detecting 
Connection-Chains: A Data Mining Approach, 
International Journal of Network Security, 
10(1), pp.62–74. 
[24] J. Yang and S. S. Huang. A Real-Time 
Algorithm to Detect Long Connection Chains 
of Interactive Terminal Session. Proceeding of 
The 3rd International Conference on 
Information Security (InfoSecu04). 14-16 
November 2004, Shanghai, China, pp. 198-203. 
[25] J. Yang and S. S. Huang. Matching TCP 
Packets and Its Application to the Detection of 
Long Connection Chains on the Internet. The 
19th International Conference on Advanced 
Information Networking and Application 
(AINA 05), 28-30 March 2005, Taipei, Taiwan, 
pp.1005-1010. 
[26] X. Wang and D. S. Reeves. Robust correlation 
of encrypted attack traffic through stepping 
stones by manipulation of interpacket delays, 
The 10th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communication Security (CCS 2003), 27-30 
October 2003, Washinton D.C., USA, pp. 20-
29. 
[27] B. Whitworth and E. Whitworth, "Spam and 
the social-technical gap," Computer, vol. 37, 
pp. 38-45, 2004. 
[28] M. Sahami, S. Dumais, D. Heckerman, and E. 
Horvitz, "A Bayesian Approach to Filtering 
Junk E-Mail," in Learning for Text 
Categorization: Papers from the 1998 
Workshop, 1998. 
[29] D. D'Ambra, "Killer spam: clawing at your 
door", Inf. Prof. 4, vol. 28, no. 4, 2007. 
[30] Z. Le, Z. Jing and Y. Tianshun, "An Evaluation 
of Statistical Spam Filtering Techinques", 
ACM Transactions on Asian Language 
Information Processing (TALIP) vol. 3, 2004, 
pp. 243-269. 
[31] M.N. Marsono, M. Watheq, and F. Gebali, 
"Binary LNS-based naïve Bayes inference 
engine for spam control: noise analysis and 
FPGA implementation", IET Comput. Digit. 
Tech, vol. 56, no. 2, 2008. 
[32] O. O. Abiona, T. Anjali, L. O. Kehinde, 
"Simulation of a cyclic multicast proxy server," 
Electro/Information Technology, 2008. EIT 
2008. IEEE International Conference on , vol., 
no., pp.102-107, 18-20 May 2008 
[33] O. Angela, R. Gibert, B. Jay and W. Joshua. 
Wireshark & Ethereal Network Protocol 
Analyzer Toolkit (Jay Beale's Open Source 
Security), Syngress Publishing, Inc., 800 
Hingham Street, Rockland, MA 02370. 
[34] R. Chetan and D. V. Ashoka, "Data mining 
based network intrusion detection system: A 
database centric approach," Computer 
Communication and Informatics (ICCCI), 2012 
International Conference on , vol., no., pp.1-6, 
10-12 Jan. 2012 
[35] F. Desheng, Z. Shu and G. Ping, "The Design 
and Implementation of a Distributed Network 
Intrusion Detection System Based on Data 
Mining," Software Engineering, 2009. WCSE 
'09. WRI World Congress on , vol.3, no., 
pp.446-450, 19-21 May 2009 
[36] L. Lei, Y. De-Zhang and S. Fang-Cheng, "A 
novel rule-based Intrusion Detection System 
using data mining," Computer Science and 
Information Technology (ICCSIT), 2010 3rd 
IEEE International Conference on , vol.6, no., 
pp.169-172, 9-11 July 2010 
[37] H. Agrawal, J.  Alberi, L. Bahler, W. Conner, J. 
Micallef, A. Virodov, S. R. Snyder, 
"Preventing insider malware threats using 
program analysis techniques," MILITARY 
COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE, 2010 - 




MILCOM 2010 , vol., no., pp.936-941, Oct. 31 
2010-Nov. 3 2010 
[38] S. Rahul, “Effectiveness of Antivirus in 




backdoors, July 30, 2012. 
Advances in Remote Sensing, Finite Differences and Information Security
ISBN: 978-1-61804-127-2 205
